NIETZSCHE AND THE METAPHOR OF PEACEMAKING CRIMINOLOGY: SOME CRITICAL REFLECTIONS Jim Thomas, Julie Capps, James Carr, Tammie Evans, Wendy Lewin-Gladney, Deborah Jacobson, Chris Maier, Scott Moran, and Sean Thompson Northern Illinois University / DeKalb, IL 60115 (USA) (February 23, 2000) We are indebted to Kevin Anderson, Jim Edwards, Harry Mika, Richard Quinney, Dennis Sullivan, and Larry Tifft for sharing their insights and stimulating our thinking. =========================================== NIETZSCHE AND THE METAPHOR OF PEACEMAKING CRIMINOLOGY: SOME CRITICAL REFLECTIONS Let us begin with a fundamental realization: No amount of thinking and no amount of public policy have brought us any closer to understanding and solving the problems of crime (Quinney, 1988a: 67). Perhaps because it blends scholarship and praxis with an ideology of social harmony and unity, peacemaking criminology (PMC) risks being seen as something less than a rigorous intellectual position, and more as a philosophical belief system. As a consequence, one goal for advocates lies in expanding the tenets of PMC beyond the pale of co-ideologues in order to avoid those who, borrowing from Nietzsche, might argue: Nobody is very likely to consider a doctrine true merely because it makes people happy or virtuous--except perhaps the lovely "idealists" who become effusive about the good, the true, and the beautiful and allow all kinds of motley, clumsy, and benevolent desiderata to swim around in utter confusion in their pond (Nietzsche, 1966: 49). The essays in this volume attest both to the growth of the perspective of peacemaking criminology (PMC) especially the restorative justice variant, and the diversity of ways that practitioners have attempted to implement its tenets in research and in practice. Yet, the increased interest in peacemaking criminology in the past decade has also led to corresponding questions about its practical utility and intellectual consistency. Is the perspective useful as a means to reduce crime? Or, is it simply a catch-all buzzword used by politically and intellectually diverse advocates, with little substantive value beyond mobilizing for group hugs and a mass chorus of "We Shall Overcome?" This chapter examines whether PMC has sufficient intellectual relevance and significant potential for realistic applicability, or whether it is simply a muddle-minded means for idealists to become, as Nietzsche suggested, "effusive about the good, the true, and the beautiful." Although some of our commentary may seem critical, we are unequivocally sympathetic to the perspective, and it influences much of our own work. Yet, we have collective reservations about adopting the term as a mantel around which to wrap either our research or our praxis without first assessing what we wear when we don it. Many of our concerns seem either unaddressed by advocates, or, worse, ignored as irrelevant to peacemaking goals. This risks reducing PMC to a feel-good ethos while limiting adherents to preaching to the choir. We begin by summarizing the generally shared elements of PMC. Next, we examine several criticisms of the perspective, and finally we identify its potential utility for mainstream scholars, policy makers, and practitioners. What is Peacemaking Criminology? Perhaps we take peacemaking criminology too seriously. Then again, perhaps we should ask why we should take it seriously at all. It probably depends on how we define it, where we see it located in the pantheon of social theory (if at all), and of what practical, ideological, or substantive relevance it has. There is no doubt that the perspective has become more visible in recent years. One irony, however, is that the more visible it becomes, the less substance it seems to have. Who, after all, can dispute that it's better to be nice than not nice, and pain and suffering should be avoided? The first difficulty in assessing peacemaking criminology begins with identifying a clear, reasonably encompassing definition, or even a group of precepts that bind adherents. The perspective is not a theory, because it lacks an identifiable core of readily testable postulates or claims, contains more vision than explanation, and does not seem amenable to modification when confronted with contentious factual or other challenges. In fact, many advocates of the perspective seem to avoid addressing criticisms. It is not a systematic philosophy, because it contains no well-articulated premises or method developing ideas. Although identified with the discipline of criminology, peacemaking criminology is not a discipline, because it possesses no integrating set of systematic theories or method or significant policy-oriented guidelines. Therefore, we begin our exploration of PMC by initially viewing it as a perspective, or a stance from which to view and comment upon objects within our gaze. A peacemaking perspective in the social sciences is hardly new. Three decades ago, Curle (1971) articulated a detailed theory of strategies for replacing conflict with peace, and journals such as Humanity and Society have long nurtured a social science humanistic perspective. But, as the bibliographic entries in this volume suggest, the emergence of a distinctly criminological form of "peacemaking," although it emerged over 20 years ago, has mushroomed primarily in the past decade. The growth occured largely as a response to the perceived futilitity of the warmaking metaphor that dominates crime control research and scholarship (Kraska, 1999) and in part in response to the need to integrate criminal justice theory and practice within a broader framework of basic human needs. The seeds of a kinder, gentler mainstream criminology that responded to human needs rather than reacted to human misdeeds was stimulated especially by the works of Tifft (1979; Tifft and Sullivan, 1980) and Pepinsky (1979). In arguing for minimalist state control structures and spiritual rejuvenation as the preconditions for a just society, Tifft (1979) offered one of the earliest systematic attempts to establish a base for a criminology of peacemaking. Tifft's responsive anarchism was a call for a society based on love, one that attends to essential human needs. Stressing empathy for the plight of others, he argued that existing social structures and forms of appropriation perpetuate human misery, and that crime and misery are irrevocably intertwined. Spiritual rejuvenation requires empathy with those who, because of their social position, are more likely to be relegated to life conditions characterized by structural inequality, existential despair, and physical or mental suffering. Developing a similar theme of a humanist social science, Pepinsky (1979: 250) observed that, "rather than trying to find out what is, the humanist uses data to calculate what can be." In doing so, he contributed to criminology a transformative set of ideals to guide the emerging perspective as a research direction. In later refinements, Pepinsky (1988) argued that there is a direct relationship between violence and social unresponsiveness that occurs through processes of depersonalization. Like Tifft, Pepinsky challenged us to rethink our conceptualization of crime, and suggested that an act of crime is conventionally defined by nuances of context and motive, a distinction he rejects (Pepinsky, 1988: 551-553). However, the articulation of an explicit peacemaking perspective in criminology arguably began with the works of Richard Quinney (1988a, 1988b, 1988c), and further developed by others, such as Anderson (1989) and Pepinsky (1988, 1995, 1998). These and other early advocates argued that crime is but one form of violence among many, including war, debilitating social formations, destructive forms of interaction, and structural factors that suppress human potential. The antidote required a pro-active approach to crime and justice characterized by a focus on universal social justice as the prerequisite to elimination of predatory behavior. The diversity of views by advocates of the perspective clouds a clear image of the nature, implications, and content of peacemaking criminology. Despite, or more likely because of, the growing diverse interest the perspective, like six Pirandellian characters, it remains in search of a unifying set of authors to provide it with a unique identity. Many proponents view peacemaking criminology as simply a term used to bridge the macro-micro theoretical and policy chasms between social structure, the criminal justice system, and the individual. What, then, is peacemaking criminology? Few, if any, leading adherents see it as a theory. Most would accept Sullivan's view that: ...peacemaking criminology is a perspective, a way of looking at the world which on the most intimate of levels means human relationships--how we form them, how we maintain them, and how we restore them when things go wrong (Sullivan, email communication, Dec. 2, 1999). Although not all agree with Mika's vision of PMC, he nonetheless confronts the definitional problem in an attempt to recast it as a way of pulling and holding diverse ideological groups around a core of shared humanism: I prefer to think of peacemaking criminology even more informally, where it is a comfortable conversation between individuals who subscribe to a very broad range of critical, dialectical, and reflexive orientations to justice (Mika, 1999). Although helpful, these definitions are vague on content and ambiguous on practices, leading both critics and sympathetic observers to find the perspective abstruse and lacking practical substance. For example, Akers (1997: 183) sees PMC as little more than a vague utopian vision that, while laudable, is of little use as an explanatory model for crime or for processing offenders. The tendancy of leading proponents of the perspective to ignore or dismiss criticisms creates credibility problems and feeds the Nietzschean view that PMC advocates are lovely idealists swimming around in befuddled confusion. Addressing the Critics Ironically, many criticisms of peacemaking criminology come not from adherents of "warmaking" metaphors, but from observers associated with progressive or leftist perspectives who are otherwise sympathetic to its goals. Although some of the criticisms we identify here derive from published commentaries, we also draw extinsively from conference presentations and discussions, collegial conversations, email dialogs, and electronic discussion group exchanges. We first summarize a few of the more interesting criticisms and then suggest ways to counter them. THE MARXIAN CONNECTION First, the peacemaking perspective seems to some critics the antithesis of traditional "progressive" positions such as conflict theory, critical theory, or Marxian-oriented perspectives. Akers (1997: 184), for example, has argued that it is contradictory to claim Marx as a significant theoretical basis, because of Marx's own emphasis on class conflict and non-rejection of violence as the means for social change. In this view, the Marxian warmaking metaphor of social struggle and the necessity of class conflict lie in opposition to a vision of peacemaking vision. THE FUNCTIONALIST CONNECTION A second concern with peacemaking criminology has been voiced at conference sessions or in less formal discussions by critics who otherwise tend to share the humanist and "progessive" ideological views of PMC advocates. Unlike the core of conflict theory, which holds that conflict is a fundamental part of the social process and that all societies rest upon constraint of some members by others (e.g., Chambliss and Siedman, 1971), the PMC perspective rejects the necessity of conflict, or "negative peace," which is any coercive apparatus--such as the criminal justice system--used against people who challenge a preferred social order (Quinney, 1998: 358). Because the basis of peacemaking lies on establishing harmony and reducing the structural conditions, status hierarchies, and interactional styles that facilitate conflict, some skeptics have suggested that, if we substitute "consensus" with "peacemaking," we have a variant of functionalism. In this view, the telos of peace or harmony is seen as driving social behavior and institutions. Because functionalism's tenet that all social systems are based on consensus, it is seen as inherently conservative, so this argument runs. It follows, then, that because the peacemaking perspective is also based on consensus and harmony, it is likewise a de facto conservative teleological view. Hence, the spiritual unity advocated by peacemaking criminologists presupposes a hive mentality that would replace democratic pluralism with homogeneous passivity. THE CONSERVATIVE CONNECTION A third criticism also suggests that PMC is conservative, not because of ideological or theoretical assumptive premises, such as those found in functionalism, but because of an irony inherent in the core values of advocates. In this view, heard especially among political militants and community activists, the emphasis on peace and the over-riding tenet to reject conflict, especially violence, ultimately supports, even strengthen, an oppressive status quo by espousing a passive impotent and generally ineffective belief system that leads to martyrdom rather than social change. For example, some critics contend that Quinney's (1991: 348) observation that peacemaking criminologists need not directly engage in conflict but can, instead, bear witness to the suffering brought about by exploitation, poverty, greed, hate, inequality, and other destructive features of our culture connotes excessive pacifism at a best, "acquiesence to evil" at worst. In this view, victims do not need witnesses, they need warriors: Kitty Genovese {a woman stabbed to death in New York City while 38 people witnessed the attack for 35 minutes and failed to report it} had witnesses who watched over nearly two hours as her assailant stabbed her to death. She didn't need witnesses. She needed someone to intervene. And that's my problem with peacemaking criminologists. They are silent on the question of how we should intervene in unpleasantness (Conference critic, American Society of Criminology Meetings, November, 1999). In the view of these critics, direct conflict, whether in the form of hostile arguments, direct confrontation, or even the necessity of physical intervention, may be necessary to fight injustice or reduce harm. Failure to do otherwise, in this view, is simply self-indulgent intellectualist idealism that a privileged few can enjoy at the expense of others less fortunate. THE CHAOS CONNECTION A fourth criticism centers on the seemingly chaotic diffusion of intellectual threads, a tendancy toward excessive hyperbole, seemingingly naive or contradictory views, and the lack of a clear definition of "peacemaking." These critics point to the ideological, polemical, discursive, and intellectual diversity of those advocating a peacemaking approach to justify the claim that PMC is little more than a hodge-podge of disconnected ideas. In this view, PMC is a dogmatic ideological ideal, one not requiring serious thinking and therefore not deserving of being taken seriously. Unfortunately, these critics are aided by the occasional hyperbole or shoddy thinking of adherents, especially by those who push the limits of pacifism by remaining silent on the question of how to deal with violence or those who commit it. For example, the argument that we should expunge not only deeds, but words or even thoughts that are "warlike," that generate "negative peace," or that make others feel bad, seems not only unrealistic, but dangerously utopian. Gilligan (1997) is among those extending the peace metaphor beyond advocating social justice by calling for social arrangements that eliminate destructive emotional states, such as feelings of shame. For Gilligan, the emotion of shame is the primary cause of all violence. Critics argue that this not only defies credibility, but also subverts the work of other scholars associated with PMC. For example, Braithwaite (1989), often cited by peacemaking scholars as a significant exemplar, argues the opposite: A society's capacity to instill in an offender the recognition of an offense and to generate a corresponding internalization of empathic responsibility--shame--constitutes a powerful social control mechanism. Unlike Gilligan, who sees shame as a necessary, albeit insufficient, cause of violence, Braithwaite sees it both as a means of social control and a peaceful way to redress a wrong after a violation has occured. Such an irreconciliably bipolar spectrum on such fundamental concepts, critics contend, makes it difficult to find a credible intellectual core. Other critics point to the view that holding persons, including offenders, responsible for their actions, reinforces the warmaking rather than peacemaking model. Perhaps because he is considered a leading PMC scholar, Harold Pepinsky often becomes targetted as one of the more extreme examples of polemical aerobics. In advocating what he describes as the Najaho style of response to social breaching, Pepinsky argues that healing and reconciliation through dialog are preferable to the concept of responsibility: Everyone leaves a truly balanced conversation free to choose what s/he does next. To the Navajo as to me, it is a contradiction in terms to make someone responsible; rather, a peacemaking process liberates one's heart to be in tune with others and to continue taking turns in interaction. Participating in a balanced conversation stimulates one's assumption of responsibility (Pepinsky, 1998). The principle of balance and reconciliation underlies the practice of restorative justice, a form of conciliatory social reponse to offenses, seen as a way to implement PMC programs. Critics note that the underlying assumptions of this approach include the belief that there is a consensus on a "spiritually correct" and universal normative order; that participants possess the ability to assess an offense and resolve it; That all parties participate willinging and are not subject to norms subtlely coercing obedience; and that status and other power asymmetries will not intrude in the process. However, one practitioner responsible for integrating restorative justice programs both within and outside of the conventional criminal justice process himself became somewhat more critical of the ideal following his own experiences: I have been thinking about the concept {of restorative justice} in terms of my own tribe's history and culture...I'm skeptical about the concept working effectively. Restorative justice is derived from communities that could restore balance because of several constraints. Religion has traditionally played major role. In the Osage tradition, in order to pay respect to Wa-kon-da (God), one would live a very structured and purposeful life. Daily ceremonies, adherence to many tribal customs, and the structure of the society itself, depended upon these beliefs. Furthermore, each of the twenty-four tribal clans had their own specific sets of ceremonies and brought their own unique contributions to the tribe as a whole. If a tribal member was not in harmony, loosely defined here, the clan or tribal priests would take notice (Personal comunication, anonymous Illinois criminal justice agency practitioner, February, 2000). In this view, the appeals for implementing the perceived peaceful practices of other cultures make nice rhetoric, but they are at best misguided and at worst dangerously misconceived for several reasons. First, the practices may hide deeper control elements that are far less peaceful, of which the "balanced conversation" is the most visible outcome. Second, it may be just one social response among many, and is reserved for less-serious transgressions. Third, restorative practices in other cultures may be more than an attempt to reconcile victim and offender; it may also be a means of mediating between other competing caste, class, or kinship groups. Finally, restorative practices emerge from and are located within a cultural context of duties, obligations, and expectations. Therefore, seeing them as something that can be readily translated into a viable practice in our own system may be unrealistic. "Balanced conversations" may seem a nice ideal, skeptics argue, but they tend to be reactive rather than proactive, and there is little evidence that they contribute--even in cultures that practice them--to less frequent predations than in cultures that do not. Further, the defintion of "balanced conversation" might not be shared by all participants, and the call for what some see as "forced reconciliation" can be seen as perpetuating, even intensifying, the feelings of powerlessness and predation by victims. Critics suggest that this type of excessive hyperbole and linguistic gerrymandering contributes to the confusion of PMC's core ideas. Although Pepinsky is not alone in the use of hyperbole, some critics find his style typical of a "cavalier use of words and twists of phrase that leaves readers shaking their head" (conference critic, 1999). Among the examples provided in a recent confernce discussion included the rejection of prisons or the call to govern them democratically (Pepinsky 1998: 2), the suggestion that a surgeon who accidentally causes a patient's death during a heart operation should be held a criminal (Pepinsky, 1988: 546), or that "obedience" is part of the warlike culture and should be opposed (Pepinsky, 1998). Some critics argue that the heart of peacemaking necessarily requires that individuals, as moral agents, accept and act upon their responsibility to others. Further, the goal of peacemaking is, at a minimum, to promote acquiesence to a harmonious and egalitarian social order and the acceptance of one's duty, which is a form of obedience, to the normative authority of the principles of peace. Therefore, it follows that rejection of concepts such as shame or obedience, even when creatively redefined, subvert one essential goal of peacemaking, which is to instill internal mechanisms for following a pre-ordained set of pre- and proscriptive norms. As a consequence, rhetorical ploys that rely on selective lexicological twists or evoke simplistic metaphors and images subvert clear thinking and conceal the problems of PMC as an intellectual position and as a viable instrument of praxis. THE CREDIBILITY CONNECTION A fifth criticism is that, like many critical theories, peacemaking criminology lacks empirical credibility. The perspective contains no explanatory postulates, and its claims are inherently unamenable to hypothesis construction and testing. Akers (1997: 183-185), for example, argues that PMC fails to offer a theory of either crime or the criminal justice sytem that can be evaluated empirically. Although its social goals, he argues, may be compatible with some religious tenants, and although it might be possible to construct testable claims, it remains a philosophy and a utopian vision rather than a testable body of ideas. Critics variously identify several difficulties with testing peacemaking postulates. First, the concept of peace, or at least variables reflecting the concept, cannot easily be operationally defined. Second, the concept of peace, or at a minumum indiators of it, must be conceptualized as an independent variable, a task associated with positivism, which many PMC advocates reject as either intellectually or ideologically viable. The common response that "peace is the absence of conflict" is unsatisfactory, because one can have peace, even "positive peace" (Quinney, 1998: 358), in a context of social oppression. Third comes the problem of identifying the factors that "cause" or are associated with peace. There is, suggest critics, no compelling reason to think that "fairness," "responsiveness," or even the vague concept of "justice" are necessary a priori conditions of peace. Is it possible to satisfy the structural requisites for peace (even if we could identify them) and yet have the peace process subverted by conflict-laden interactional processes resulting from power asymmetries in gender, race, or class? For example, interactional processes that facilitate a positive group or self-identity for all those involved in an interaction could be classified as a peaceful interaction. Enough of these collectively might create overall peace. However, if these conformed to an accepted social order in which power relations were concealed as the result of ideological blinders, such as can occur in subtle forms of interactionn influenced by racial or sexual cues, by what criteria do we evaluate "lack of peace," especially if unnecesary forms of social domination are invisible? Fourth is the problem of finding reliable data, qualitative or quantitative, with interaction as the unit of analysis. Fifth, critics suggest that even if data were obtainable, the development of a conceptual representation of the chain by which peace results would be insurmountable. Finally, even if the "causes" of peace were established, it would be difficult to demonstrate that the absence of these attributes leads to non-peace. There are other criticisms, but these five are those that we have heard most often. On balance, we judge that, while some criticisms are valid and must be addressed, others are off mark and reflect misunderstanding of the peacemaking perspective. RESPONDING TO CRITICS Is PMC internally consistent such that it even makes sense to take about it as a coherent body of thought, other than "it's nice to be nice?" Among the reasons to respond to criticisms of PMC, we offer five. First, many criticisms are based on misconceptions that, if unaddressed, take on an iterative, self-perpetuating character. Second, responding to critics moves PMC away from the perception that it is only a "feel good" philosophy that elevates ideology above critique and discourse. Third, by raising critical issues, we generate discussion of demonstrable shortcomings in the perspective as a way of overcoming them. Fourth, addressing criticisms against PMC also helps identify differences within the perspective by illustrating different traditions that influence practitioners. Finally, addressing the intellectual and other problems increases PMC's credibility, and hopefully raises recognition of its viability. One problem in working through the various criticisms--and this may be the primary problem in trying to define it--lies in what is arguably a little-discussed intellectual tension between adherents. Arguably, those working within PMC are primarily influenced by either the Enlightenment or the Romantic intellectual traditions. Although both traditions share several modernist characteristics, such as a humanist ontological and epistemlogical centering and a primacy of human agency as a force in progressive social in change, they are separated by a fundamentally different world view of humanity and knowledge: Whereas for the Enlightenment-scientific mind, nature was an object for observation and experiment, theoretical explanation and technological manipulation, for the Romantic, by contrast, nature was a live vessel of spirit, a translucent source of mystery and revelation. The scientist too wished to penetrate nature and reveal its mystery; but the method and goal of that penetration, and the character of that revelation, were different from the Romantic's. Rather than the distanced object of sober analysis, nature for the Romantic was that which the human soul strove to enter and unite with in an overcoming of the existential dichotomy, and the revelation he sought was not of mechanical law but of spiritual essence. While the scientist sought truth that was testable and concretely effective, the Romantic sought truth that was inwardly transfiguring and sublime (Tarnas, 1991: 367). For some, perhaps a minority, PMC posseses a way to integrate Enlightenment principles of progress and humanism into theory and practice (McEvoy, 1900; Mika, 199?; Mika and Zehr, 1998). Others, influenced more by Romanticism's de-emphasis of reason and celebration of the "inner soul," view peacemaking criminology as a spiritual enterprise: Quinney refines this by building on nine observations: (1) Thought of the Western rational mode is conditional, limiting knowledge to what is already known. (2) The truth of reality is emptiness; all that is real is beyond human conception. (3) Each life is a spiritual journey into the unknown and the unknowable, beyond the egocentric self. (4) Human existence is characterized by suffering; crime is suffering; and the sources of suffering are within each of us. (5) Through love and compassion, beyond the egocentric self, we can end suffering and live in peace, personally and collectively; (6) The ending of suffering can be attained in a quieting of the mind and an opening of the heart, in being aware. (7) Crime can be ended only with the end of suffering, only when there is peace--through love and compassion found in awareness. (8) Understanding, service, justice: All these flow naturally from love and compassion, from mindful attention to the reality of all that is here and now. (9) A CRIMINOLOGY OF PEACEMAKING [italics in original}, the nonviolent criminology of compassion and service, seeks to end suffering and thereby eliminate crime (Quinney, 1991: 3-4). PMC's critics tend toward an Enlightenment-based critique of PMC's "Romantic wing." This one-sided focus exagerates the empirical weaknesses while ignoring the Enlightenment-influenced aspects. Although the implications of PMC as a merging of two traditions are beyond the scope of this paper, our own discussion emphasizes the shared features of Romantic and Enlightenment advocates, but draws from the latter when critics elide into a reified caricature the views of the former. THE MARXIAN CONNECTION (Redux) Because so many peacemaking scholars are associated with Marxian or conflict-oriented theories, the criticism that these perspectives are incompatible with and even subvert the PMC position might seem intellectually devastating. In fact, there are fundamental congruences between Marx and PMC. The integrative power between Marxist and more spiritual philosophies has been illustrated by Anderson's (2000, 1991, 1989) attempts to unify Marx, Gandhi and other humanistic scholars, and Quinney's (1988a, 1988c) replacement of western thought with eastern philosophy. Anderson (1991) has offered a compelling argument that the core of Marxian praxis is grounded in a humanistic framework that, like peacemaking criminology, espouses a peace-based culture and society. There are several points of common ground. First, both are shaped by Enlightement principles. Among these include the belief in the power of reason; the potential for the accumulation and application of scientific knowledge to contribute to theoretical understanding; the belief in the value of rational control, technological enhancement, and mass communication; an adherence to established norms of testing validity claims; acceptance of the view of the possibility of establishing transcendent value premises; and the belief in the possibility of progressive social change through human intervention. However, these features are not shared with equal enthusiasm between PMC scholars influenced by Romanticism. Quinney (1991: 3), for example, has challenged the "Western rational mode" of knowing as conditional and incomplete, and Pepinsky (1988) has challenged the utility of positivism in criminological research. Others (eg, Pepinsky, 1995; Tifft, 1979; Tifft and Sullivan, 1980) tend to emphasize decentralization and the role of the individual in creating social order. Further, judging from the lack of empirical analysis and assessment of tenets and claims, there would seem to be an indifference among PMC proponents to conventional scholarship. However, it would be premature to assume that PMC scholars reflecting the Romanticist tradition reject rationalism or claims-testing, because the perspective is built on the power of critical thought and the value of empirical illustrations of the debilitating nature of contemporary social systems. Despite the differing emphases on shared features between Romanticism and Enlightenment PMC advocates and whith Marx, the commonalities provide a bonding core of essential ideas. This is relevant for several reasons. First, this shared framework suggests basic compatability rather than necessary opposition between each. Second, an Enlightenment foundation sets PMC apart from other perspectives that might advocate peace based on the authority of religious doctrine rather than rational critique. This distinction is useful when contrasting PMC with other so-called "peacemakers," such as the "Religous Right" or "Christian Coalition." Third, the Marxian tradition suggests a line of inquiry and action for many PMC scholars who have been influenced by the tradition. Finally, by recognizing the overtones of the Enlightenment tradition underlying PMC, we can more easily avoid critics' reduction of it to little more than spiritualism, anti-rationalism, or relativism. Values. A third similarity, both perspectives are based on the premise that it is possible to establish a set of fairly immutable core values on which to ground behavior and social action. Quinney (1998) has argued that criminology is, at root, a moral philosophy. The goal for Quinney and others thus becomes substituting the existing philosophy that guides criminal justice theory and practice, and which fails to provide adequate ethical guidelines for research, interpersonal social action or social action, with one that is more responsive. Underlying this view is the fundamental belief that suffering and inequality must be eliminated in order to eliminate crime. Like PMC advocates, Marx procedes from an unexplicated, but nonetheless visible value system that includes an arguably a priori Kantian-like categorical imperative similar to the fundamental PMC premise: Oppression is wrong. Derived from Hegel's theory of Objective Spirit reinterpreted through a materialistic framework, Marx's condemnation of oppressive social arrangements and corresponding exhortation to struggle for alternatives aims to reduce or eliminate unnecessary forms of social domination and control. In part deontological, and in part constructionist, Marxian and PMC perspectives each formulate precepts for action and interaction that recognize the fundamental moral imperative of "doing good." Yet, both acknowledge the socially contingent nature of dominant value systems that subtlely facilitate conflict by reinforcing the ideological ediface of dominant social relations while obscuring alternate value precepts that would enhance, rather than subvert, a peaceful society. Human Nature. Another way to examine the relationship between Marxian-informed and peacemaking perspectives lies in teasing out selected shared characteristics, some implicit others explicit, of their respective views of human nature. "Human nature" is an ambiguous concept that risks debates over whether behavior and "urges" are socially constructed and contextual, or instead essentialist and hard-wired into us. Here, we use the term "human nature" heuristically (and cautiously) to describe how each perspective begins from, builds upon, and seeks to nurture a social order based on a similar vision of humanity. Each presupposes that developing to the fullest our individual and social potential is a fundamental condition of our species. Both perspectives see an innate dignity in our species, and protecting and enhancing that dignity is an integral part of each. Peacemaking criminology implicitly rejects the premise that we, as a species, are innately violent and committed to self-interest (Gil, 1999). The destructive behaviors and debilitating social structures that often characterize our culture result from a variety of factors. These include constraining modes of knowing, ideological systems that maintain non-coercive conceptual machinery for maintaining an oppressive social order, social institutions that create and reinforce destructive and unjust social relations, and forms of interaction that perpetuate individual pain and suffering that results from power inequities and inegalitarian social arrangements. Both Marxian/Conflict and PMC perspectives see us not so much in struggle with our own nature as we are with the social forces that suppress human potential. Although he never directly addressed human nature, there is in Marx's writings an implicit view of it based on a distinction between "animal nature" and "species nature" (Marx, 1975: 277). The former we share with other animals, but the later is exclusive to our species, and begins when we organize to produce our means of subsistence (Marx, 1974: 42): Man is a species being, not only because in practice and in theory he adopts the species (his own as well as those of other things as his own, but--and this is only another way of expressing it--also because he treats himself as the actual, living species; because he treats himself as a _UNIVERSAL_ {italics in original} and therefore a free being (Marx, 1975: 275). The justification for the emancipatory potential of a Marxian perspective draws from this distinction. While people may as a species share innate characteristics, we possess a contingent nature that depends on the material conditions that shape and are shaped by how we create and express our life (Marx, 1974: 42). As a consequence, material conditions may either constrain or facilitate attempts to develop our full species potential. One of the most destructive features of contemporary society is alienation, or the condition in which "we are separated from the objects of our affirmation." This is significant for two reasons. First, it promotes the view that human nature is malleable and socially contingent. Second, it follows from this that predatory crime is not an inevitable consequence of "human nature." This underlying non-essentialist ethos in Marx's early writings is not only consistent with, but the basis for, the development of peacemaking criminology. As Wozniak (2000) has argued in illustrating Erich Fromm's relevance for PMC, a humanistic-based perspective can become a powerful tool in "sensitizing criminologists to the ways ways that alienation penetrates the fabric of macro-level social institutions and, on the micro-level, the lives and minds of individual actors." Anderson (2000), too, offers a cogent attempt to illustrate the humanistic, non-violent underpinnings of Marxian-informed theory and practice by integrating Marx, Critical Theory, and Fromm to illustrate the peacemaking potential of Marx's ideas. This provides the foundation of the PMC project as one of actualizing Marx's "species being:" On the broadest level, then, peacemaking criminology offers us a view of life in which, negatively, we seek to put an end to violence, to those acts that deny our persons validity, that dismiss who we are, that keep us from finding, as Kierkegaard might say "that self which one truly is" (Sullivan, email communication, Dec. 2, 1999). Human Agency and Social Change. Finally, both Marxian and peacemaking perspectives view the human actor as the fundamental agent in social control. For both, existing social arrangments and accompanying ideology constrain our ability to recognize, articulate, and act upon the sources of unnecessary social domination. For Marx, through our work on our "objective world," we duplicate ourselves in consciousness and in the "reality" of the social structures, institutions, and forms of interaction we create (Marx, 1975: 277). Because this also reproduces the conditions that restrict realization of our full species potential and objectifies and degrades our species life, social action includes the inter-related tasks of transforming both consciounessness and social structure. Peacemaking criminology also emphasizes the role of human agency in the individual and social transformative process. However, unlike the Marxian perspective, which focuses heavily on the need to change structural arrangements as the primary form of praxis, many peacemakers adopt a more idealist approach, and tend to view transforming individual consciousness and existence as the first necessary step toward changing structure. For some, changing social structure begins with a spiritual transformation of the human psyche, which will direct our subsequent praxis: When our hearts are filled with love and our minds with willingness to serve, we will know what has to be done and how it is to be done. Such is the basis of a NONVIOLENT CRIMINOLOGY (italics in original; Quinney, 1991: 12). Other PMC scholars, however, introduce a more structural view. In summarizing the foundations of PMC, Mika provided a succinct summary of the integrated necessity for examining social structure while simultaneously expanding conscious understanding of the peacemaking goal and ways to attain it: So we have said, I think, that: 1) Peacemaking criminology is premised on developing an understanding of the social bases of structural and interpersonal violence and their engine power in its coat of many colors that both creates and perpetuates the harms in contemporary life that undergird human interactions and social arrangements. We have also said, I think, that: 2) Peacemaking criminology is equally premised on developing an understanding of peace, on finding in our collective response to harms a justice that is participatory and inclusive, attentive to the root causes of harms and their prevention, driven by the satisfaction of needs and achievement of equal well-being (Mika, 1999b). Despite congruences, there are, of course, substantial differences between Marxian and peacemaking perspectives. By identifying similarities, we do not minimimize difference, especially at the theoretical level. For example, few scholars outside of Marxians, including peacemakers, have any particularly strong interest in such fundamental theoretical issues as emphasis on the commodity relations of capitalism, the theory of surplus, the labor theory of value, necessity of class struggle, or the tendential decline in the rate of profit. Yet, substantial theoretical differences should not obscure common themes that overlap in each perspective, that illustrate, that the two are not only compatible, but also converge fundamental dimensions. THE CONSERVATIVE CONNECTION (Redux) The second citicism, that the peacemaking perspective is inherently conservative because it shares the functionalist core assumption that societies are based on consensus, reflects at least three errors. The first is a fatal false analogy: That two perspectives employ similar concepts does not make them homologous such that they share similar domain assumptions or premises. To suggest that functionalists and PMC adherents employ "harmony" or "consensus similarly confuses functionalism's assumptive concept with PMC's prescriptive use of the term as both an ideal state and a form of transformative praxis. Second, functionalism, a macro theory for understanding social structure demphasizes micro-analytical issues and the significance of the human in creating, maintaining, and changing the social order. The PMC perspective, by contrast, combines macro-micro analysis by focusing on the structural factors that contribute to crime and the conditions that facilitate it and on how oppressive conditions are recreated through language, status-based interaction, and ideology. More importantly, PMC emphasizes the necessity of bottom-to-top social change and sees individual praxis as one means by which to shape a more harmonious, less violent world. Finally, despite the iterative power of the "functionalism is conservative!" mantra, nothing inherent in either the background or domain assumptions of funct require such an immutable conclusion. In fact, a cogent argument could be made that functionalism is consistent with a radical/humanist perspective: If there is some wisdom in the saying, "You have to know the system to beat the system," then functionalism can help those who are dedicated to radical social change to a fuller understanding of how the system operates (Wallace and Wolf, 1999: 65). THE CREDIBILITY CONNECTION (Redux) The third criticism we address is the mistaken judgment that peacemaking offers no testable insights or responses either for understanding crime or reducing it. Some critics contend that peacemaking criminology is not only not "science," but offers nothing that religious groups had not offered earlier: Long before the peacemaking criminology label was adopted by Pepinsky, Quinney, and others, the in-prison religious programs and the many prison ministries run by churches and lay groups were practicing peacemaking; they have long applied the tenets of love and peaceful reformation of offenders, by persuading them toward a religious commitment and lifystyle incompatible with committing crime and causing suffering (Akers, 1998: 183). The implication that PMC is just old wine in new bottles contributes to the perception that it is little more than a secular religion disguised as a scholarly intellectual position lacking practical applicability. But, the judgment that peacemaking criminology represents little more than a secular repackaging of religion is unconvincing. Although PMC principles and programs dovetail nicely with the agendas of many religious organizations, several characteristics set them apart. First, unlike most religous organizations, especially those such as prison ministries and other groups that use carceral institutions as recruiting grounds, PMC strategies do not promote acceptance of a formal doctrine, but rather advocate humanism as form or social change. Second, religous organizations tend to have a narrower action focus, one that rarely extends to the issues of broader social import. Third, PMC has a wider range of actions on more levels. Finally, religious factions attempt to establish and maintain peace among it's members, but in doing so tend to promote out-group/in-group dichotomies. Few religous groups work primarily toward more peaceful relations among classes, races, countries, and they tend to elevate sectarian dogma over principles of peace. Jerry Fawell or Ian Paisley, for example, may have promoted "peaceful relations" in the United States or Northern Ireland respectively, but both would impose their own view of "peace" conforming to their rigid doctrinal postions. Peacemaking criminology, by contrast, rejects sectarianism and offers a means of tieing diverse ideological threads into a shared tapestry built on the common ground of establishing peaceful social relations. This is done not by converting non-believers, but by implementing reform-oriented programs and creating individual and social consciounsess of ways that conflict can be overcome. Peacemakers might argue that their goal isn't to engage in research or test hypotheses, but rather to transform the world through social action. However, that practioners opt not to engage in conventional research is not dispositive of the possibility of it. In fact, the utility of peacemaking criminology is no less testable than the tenets of any other criminology perspective, such as symbolic interaction, labelling theory, or rational choice models. Defense of empirical credibility might strike especially those influenced by Rom as unnecessary, even a anathema, because it saps energy that could be invested in promoting the concept of peace. However, because the perspective is being pursued by academics who try to persuade other academics of the viability of the perspective, we offer several reasons why peacemaking advocates should encourage empirical assessment of peacemaking principles and programs. First, peacemaking is presented as an intellectual postition; therefore, rigorous scholarship would promote, not hinder, its development. Second, new scholars accepting academic positions where tenure requires publication may be discouraged from pursuing a line of inquiry that is seen as neither rigorous nor intellectual, but instead is viewed as a conversation among co-ideologues. Third, supporting evidence is useful when making claims. Therefore, substantiating that a peacemaking alternative is "better" than the present model requires more than prophetic rhetoric, sermonizing, or homilies. Credibility depends on evidence. Fourth, policy formulation and implementation require evidence to answer the question: "What works?" Critics correctly adduce the difficulty of operationally conceptualizing the concept of peace to underscore the testability problem. However, we need not define the broad concept of "peace" any more than, to alleviate physical suffering, we need operationalize "health." It is necessary only to define the symptoms and their hypothosized source. If, for example, we posit a relationship between social inequality and crime, a reasonable hypothesis, testability becomes easier. If we posit that, to reduce crime, criminal justice agencies should implement policies or programs associated with peacemaking criminology such as education, victim-offender reconciliation, resorative justice practices, or conflict mediation, we can readily test the ouctome with conventional quantitative or qualitative methods such as comparative analysis or experiments. We could also take a random sample of communities that implement restorative justice in a similar fashion and compare those with demographically similar communities that do not. Identifying and testing factors that are associated with peace is equally possible. Do social responses to crime that are less punitive than incarceration lead to such possible outcomes as reduced recidivism, less serious offending, or other measurable consequences? Do programs build around social responsiveness have the expected consequence of reducing suffering? Does reduced suffering lead to reduced crime? Does the reduction of racism or sexism in a community or within experimental groups lead to reduced crime or recidivism? Does implementation of emathy therapy rather than obedience training have a similar outcome? Quinney (2000: 21), often considered the most spiritual of peacemaking scholars, has observed that "What is important in the study of crime is everything that happens before the crime occurs." Despite the vagueness of the observation, it nonetheless is grounded in a domain assumption that a discernable set of factors generates a particular outcome, and that by altering those factors we alter the outcome. Whether the precedents of crime are grounded in social structure or human agency, and whether reshaping those precedents by reducing shame, suffering, or unfairness is irrelevant. What matters is that the action-oriented philsophy of peacemaking criminology generates a number of testable claims. For this reason, the perspective clearly has the potential to be more than "a vague utopian vision" of little explanatory use for understanding or fighting crime. It contains rich possiblities for understanding the etiology of crime and identifying remedies that are testable through either the canons of normal science or Deweyian pragmatism. The intent of this section has not been to overcome the criticisms we identify, but rather to suggest directions for resolving them. Even if resolved, however, peacemaking criminology still faces the perception that it is excessively ideological and therefore cannot appeal to mainstream scholars or practitioners. being weak on strategies for implementing PMC-informed policies. Peacemaking as Criminal Justice Praxis If the peacemaking perspective is to be more than merely a rallying mantra, then it should have direct policy implications for the criminal justic system, or peripheral implications for praxis that would bring the system more in line with the vision of peace and love. Some critics suggest that peacemaking criminologsts, while effusive about the good, the true, and the beautiful, are too muddle-minded to offer anything of policy significance (Akers, 1998: 183). If correct, this criticism would be fatal. Fortunately, as the articles in this volume and elsewhere various demonstration projects attest, this criticism is insustainable. To compartmentalize peacemaking criminology into the standard areas of police, courts, and corrections does violence to both to the perspective and its application. In practice, peacemaking efforts are geared toward breaking down the conceptual barriers that narrow our thinking, but also to expanding our thinking to see criminal justice agencies as interconnected with and grounded in broader social processes. Fuller's (1998) four-fold typology suggests several levels on which peacemaking criminology could be or has been implemented. The broadest level involves organization around international issues that can be addressed locally. The second, institutional, level includes focusing on governmental agencies (especially the criminal justice system), political or social structures, or embedded cultural practices (such as racism or sexism). Third, interpersonal action invites assessing and changing how people interact with one another in ways that enhance what Habermas (1981) recognized as the intersubjective forms of domination that repress realization of individual and group potential. Finally, the intra-personal level is a call for individual transformation and individual self-actualization. International/global action. Some PMC advocates begin with a macro-level analysis that requires fundamental changes in social structure as a way of establishing the foundations for creating a peace social order. Following the adage that "none can be free until all are free," a balanced and harmonious existence at the micro level cannot occur without recognizing the origins of socially-structurally induced violence (Gil, 1999). On the global level, peacemaking criminologists offer a vision of an interconnectedness between all things, similar to the Marxian doctrine of internal relations. This requires making governments more responsive to its own people as well as people affected by its policies, and to oppose war or other means of violence as way to pursue social justice (Cullen, 1999). The goal, as Elias (1991) argues is to work for peace by promoting human rights both on the streets and among nations. Institutional/systemic action. At the institutional level, peacemaking challenges unresponsive and repressive systems of government, economic systems, religious systems. By examining how institutions have developed and how they implement rules and policies and create the ideological and related apparatus necessary for control, action can take many trajectories. Groups working to reform the criminal justice system, such as prison reform and anti-capital punishment organizations, community/police neighborhood councils, and similar collectives provide one line of direct action. Caulfield (1999) nicely demonstrates the variegated peacemaking intersections between feminism, the military, and criminal justice for research and policy. Grassroots projects also provide a short-term strategy for promoting social justice, as Barak (1991) illustrated in his study of a community-based homeless shelter. Institutional action can occur within the criminal justice system in many ways. In law enforcement agencies, community policy, ehanced informal dispute resolution, and police-community involvement are a few viable options. For example, although aware of political, practitioner, and other barriers, Volpe (1991) suggests police-citizen mediation programs as one way of implementing peacemaking practices in the criminal justice system. This, she argues, would shift the emphasis from an adversarial process to one of conflict resolution between disputants. At the judicial level, peacemaking criminology offers a way to move from the current punitive model of retributive justice to a more responsive one based on responsiveness to the needs of society, the victim, and the offender. Although some peacemakers reject the concept of punishment and confinement, most do not, and neither concept is incompatible with PMC. The goal is on balancing the needs of all parties rather than exacting a "just measure of pain." Prison-oriented peacemaking activity includes working for the attrition of prisons (Knopp 1991) or developing peace-oriented self-help or "healing" programs that teach nonviolence (Rucker, 1991). Community-oriented examples of a peacemaking process are reflected in neighorhood associations, "peacemaking courts" of native Americans such as the Navaho (Pepinsky, 1998: 3) or other indigenous societies (Melton, 1995). Fuller (1998) adds a list of additional social/institutional level targets for policy, including drug legalization, opposition to capital punishment, increased emphasis on rehabilitation of offenders, expansion of community policing, aggressive gun control, implementing peacemaking programs for youth, especially as a way of dealing with gang culture, and implementing peacemaking alternatives in the court system. Interpersonal/intrapersonal Action. The final third and fourth levels of Fullers's (1998) action typology focus on indviduals as they interact with others and as they engage in their own personal development. At the interpersonal level, peacemaking criminology invites reflection on the ways in which power asymmetries are recreated and maintained in every social encounter. Once recognized the goal is to change our attitudes and ways of social interaction. At this level, PMC: ....has to do with a way of life and a choice to live a certain way with and among others, a way that refuses to seek and exercise power and that means ultimately redeeming our words and selves out of the marketplace (Sullivan, 1999, personal Communication). Finally, the intrapersonal level refers to how we treat ourselves and invites personal transformation. Knopp (1991: 184) argues that the first step in social change is consciousness raising, "or seeing the need for the new." This requires "learning how to organize and construct the new," which she sees as a new restorative-justice model, especially in crimes of sexual aggression and violence. Growth on the intrapersonal level requires that we be gentle, forgiving, and learn how to make peace with ourselves (Fuller, 1998: 41). Activity on these four levels overlaps and builds off the others. On effective way to integrate them is through education, especially the promotion of wholistic peace edcuation (Mackey, 1998) or justice literacy (Brush, Caulfield, and Snyder-Joy, 1998; McEvoy and Mika, 1998; Sanzen, 1991; Sullivan, Tifft and Cordella, 1998). Such programs combine to promote individual growth while raising consciousness that alters behaviors and suggests avenues for systemic and global participation. A second way to integrate peacemaking in criminal justice, and one that is beginning to receive attention by mainstream practitioners (Boyes-Watson, 1999), are programs based on restorative justice. As Sullivan and Tifft (1998) remind us, restorative justice is intertwined with us at all levels of existence, including the work place, home, and in interpersonal communication. This suggests that restorative justice transcends the reactive component of the criminal justice system, making it a powerful integrative approach (Bazemore, 1998). Peacemaking as Metaphor We have argued that, although peacemaking criminology has not yet overcome many of the problems that keep it out of the mainstream, many of the criticisms either lack foundation or can be successfully addressed. We also identified several ways that peacemaking criminology has been or can be implemented in the criminal justice system. However, this still has not brought us to closure to a definition or summary of the perspective. Many of the definitional and other problems dissolve if, rather than demand a clearly focused definition, we instead see the peacemaking perspective as a metaphor that juxtaposes the imagery of war, violence and conflict against those of harmony, reparation, and healing. When understood as a cognitive mapping device, the perspective becomes a lens through with which to reframe existing responses to social offense and control by which to suggest and implement alternatives. Different metaphors produce different sets of images through which to view, interpret, and act upon our world. Metaphors provide icons and mapping techniques for interpreting and acting upon the social terrain. Metaphors also allow us to examine and discuss our objects from several perspectives, employing various sets of imagery, thus expanding our concrete knowledge of, as well as our insight into, the topic of choice. By replacing the metaphor of war with that of peace, we redirect our gaze to an alternate recoding of aspects of social existence into a more fruitful set of images. To paraphrase Brown's (1976: 178) observation in a related context, the choice in selecting peacemaking is not between scientific rigor and critical criminology, but between more or less fruitful metaphors, and between rejecting metaphors of violence or being their victims. Like all critical metaphors, that of peacemaking directs attention to symbols of oppression and suggests strategies for reconceptualizing crime, social control, and their relationship to our fundamental existence. As metaphor, even the excessive hyperbole of some of the more extreme commentators are more easily seen as bathos, a rhetorical trope by which mundane discourse is exaggerated to produce images of loftier significance. As a metaphor, peacemaking criminology is both a sensitizing concept and a set of heuristic images that become transofrmative elements in a dialetical process of changing both individual consciousness and the social conditions that bread unnnecessary forms of social domination. As metaphor, peacemaking criminology may best be seen as a means for coalition building. It provides a means of cutting across ideological boundaries by suggesting forms of praxis that range from something as simple is creating new forms of consciousness at one end to more idealistic calls for fundamental social, political, and cultural changes on the other. Finally, the metaphor of "peacemaking" merges the Romantic and Enlightment intellectual traditions into a dialectical blend of science and spirit. By recongizing the power ofthe metaphor to unify two ways of viewing, thinking about, and acting upon our existence and our social world, it becomes easier to understand that the two traditions are not in opposition, but supplement each other. Our own exploration of peacemaking criminology led us to three conclusions that, for us, helped clarify the perspective. First, PMC constitutes a paradigm shift, or a new direction for developing theories, methods, concepts, and forms of action for reducing crime. Second, PMC offers a redemptive rejuvenation not only for criminal justice practitioners and scholars, but also for those charged with social offense. Finally, the perspective challenges our thinking not only about crime, but about the fundamental foundations of our social existence. Introduction How is it that we begin where it would seem most natural to depart? The answer lies partly in how the excursion into peacemaking has influenced our own thinking and created new ways of looking at the world. But, mostly the answer lies in the nature of PMC: It is nothing less than a call for a new beginning forth those involved in the criminal justice process as well as for those who pass through it. At its best, it is a redemptive call for action. One of us has a friend who defines himself as a "peacemaking criminal justice practitioner." He has been imprisoned for a quarter century for participation in a series of gang-related killings following his release from the military during the Viet Nam war. His offenses were exceptionally violent and unjustifiable. During his years in prison, he began a long process of self-transformation. Often, he relapsed into his previous attitudes and behaviors. But, he continually struggled, and found new strength, primarily in religion. In recent discussions, he described how his growing faith was gradually helping him confront the magnitude of his past offenses, for which he had been in denial. He explained his efforts to guide younger prisoners away from their anger and violence and lead them toward a more peace-based existence, both with themselves and in their community. "My work at creating peace begins with each single individual," he explained. "I start with just one man." In some ways, the prisoner's journey resembles our own, albeit far less dramatically. Our entry into this project began when the volume's editor, Kieran McEvoy, accepted the suggestion that our graduate seminar on the U.S. criminal justice sytem write a collective article. For some of us, criminal justice is a practitioners' field in which peacemaking seems quite alien. For others of us, peacemaking is something we do in our daily lives, something that seemed unrelated to our academic pursuits. A few of us are actively involved in attempts to humanize prisons. All of us were skeptical of the perspective of peacemaking criminology, not so much for what it represents, but for the apparent confusion surrounding the central tenets, the lack of clear strategies for implementation, and the inability or refusal of many adherents to respond to the hard questions of how we, individually or collectively, respond to specific instances of violence of all types. Our final assessment of peacemaking criminology, then, is not a conclusion, but rather a beginning. We find our lesson in the prisoner who attempted to reconcile the violent world in which he lived and to which he had contributed with his peacemaking beliefs. Ultimately, the value of peacemaking, whether grounded in criminology or some other enterprise, lies in the degree to which individuals can transform themselves and then their interactions andand social institutions away from a violent and hostile environment and towar one that is more conducive to fulfilling the "species being" of which Marx spoke. Peacemaking is nothing less than an integrative new beginning, one in which the metaphor of peace guides the interplay between self-transformation and broaderr social change. As a consequence, we need not fear the Nietzschean criticism of muddled idealism. Peacemaking criminology possesses potential as a powerful weapon of critique in doing battle against violent metaphors and actions. 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